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The notion of ideology is enjoying somewhat of a renaissance in the past decade 
as an explanatory concept in social and political critique. In this context ideology refers 
to “a web of ideas and beliefs that guide people as they give meaning to, make sense of, 
and evaluate the world and their connections with each other” (Coakley, 2011, p.69). 
Crucially, ideology is an implicit theory about human nature and society that becomes 
widely accepted as common sense. This renewed interest in the potential of ideology as a 
critical concept opens up a space where psychology can contribute to a more thorough 
investigation of how neoliberal meaning-making frameworks come to be accepted as 
common sense.  
Neoliberalism itself is a very contested and notoriously elusive term (e.g. Chari, 
2015), but will be understood here as a twofold phenomenon: (a) as “an all-embracing 
economic and political ideology that advocates the supremacy of the market over any 
alternative social arrangements” (Mahone, 2005, p.1626) of decision making, including 
in the allocation of resources; (b) as a cultural project which sees the freedom of the 
Individual as antithetical to any form of collective organisation; as described by Bourdieu 
(1998), its aim is the empowerment of the individual through the systematic destruction 
of collectives. Competition is elevated to a generalised principle to be applied at all levels 
of society as the form of social organisation that is most conducive to the values of self-
   
 
   
 
reliance, responsibility and entrepreneurship. Crucially, this project entails the creation 
of a particular form of subjectivity (or experiencing of the self in society): the neoliberal 
subject internalises this philosophy as common sense (Figure 1), and experiences their 
own life as an economic enterprise requiring constant investment and competition.  
 
Figure 1. Diagrammatic formulation of a psychological approach to understanding the 
establishment of neoliberal common sense 
 
The cognitive approach 
One possible approach to the question of how common sense is established comes 
from the integration of insights from cognitive linguistics (Koller, 2005) into Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA; Van Dijk, 1993; 2001; Hart, 2014). At the core of this approach 
is the hypothesis that complex social cognitions rely on cognitive systems evolved for the 
processing of spatial location and physical objects (Hart, 2014, pp.164-167), and that 
discourses have the power to define and locate social agents in an abstract mental space, 
which guides one’s attitudes towards such agents. For example, the very use of the term 
‘immigrants’ in public discourse can serve to amalgamate vastly different populations in 
the mind of the subject and reify them as a homogenous category. The unreflective use of 
dichotomies such as ‘They/Us’ opens up a mental space in which ‘immigrants’ is 
   
 
   
 
juxtaposed to the Self in both spatial and moral terms – i.e., the Other is marked as being 
distant from the Self both spatially and morally (Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; Hart & 
Lukeš, 2009). In addition to defining Others in relation to the Self, discursive strategies 
can also affect the way the Self is defined in its own right – for example, Nafstad and 
Blakar (2012) argue that the rise of neoliberal individualism globally is accompanied by 
an increased usage of words reflecting individualism (I, me, rights) at the expense of ones 
reflecting communal values (we, us, solidarity, duty). According to cognitive CDA, this 
change in word choice reflects a new way of constructing the subject’s self-concept as 
atomised and excluding alternative collective forms of identity.  
 
Social essentialism 
Social phenomena are often articulated in neoliberal rhetoric through a 
framework which privileges personal traits (resilience, adaptability) and downplays 
social factors. This kind of implicit theorising about human nature, called psychological 
essentialism, is a way of thinking about objects and social groups as belonging to fixed 
categories, membership in which is immutable and informative about their properties 
(Gelman & Legare, 2011); “to the question of nature or nurture, essentialism answers 
nature.” (Smith, 2011, p.33). Human beings appear to be born as prolific and 
indiscriminate essentialists - young children tend to rely on a naïve essentialist ontology 
in which they see many everyday objects and “types” of people as natural kinds (Gelman, 
2003), however, in many cases essentialist thinking persists well into adulthood in some 
isolated domains of thought. This is especially true for social cognition and reasoning 
about categories like race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, or nationality (e.g. Haslam et al., 
2000; Bastian & Haslam, 2006) - people often intuitively attribute behaviours and 
personality characteristics to unseen or vaguely defined ‘essences’, and think about social 
categories as “natural kinds” – that is, as having an objective, ‘material’ reality 
independent of one’s thinking about them (Gelman & Legare, 2011). For example, in a 
study by Meyer et al. (2013), both American and Indian participants expressed an implicit 
belief that the recipient of an organ transplant will somehow inherit some of the 
personality traits or ‘essence’ of the organ donor, while the physical mechanism behind 
the transfer could not be easily articulated. Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) also argue that 
‘nativist’ lay theories are enjoying a renewed mass popularity over ‘environmentalist’ 
   
 
   
 
ones, not least due to skewed media portrayals of genetic research – for example in over-
simplified, one-gene explanations for complex social phenomena. Genetics are thus 
“being endowed with an almost mystical ability to shape individual and group 
characteristics, and sociocultural and environmental elements largely being ignored” 
(ibid., p.24).  
People are natural essentialists – when we are forced to navigate a complex social 
environment populated by a multitude of social groups with a myriad different ways of 
categorising others, we are often inclined to construct simplistic naïve models of social 
interaction. Such models are more likely to rely on innate personal characteristics as a 
key explanatory mechanism, and therefore the essentialist bias in social cognition can 
provide a stable foundation for the neoliberal common sense of personal responsibility. 
This does not mean that our social intuition is necessarily politically biased, or that we 
are ‘primed’ for the culture of neoliberalism – essentialist thinking is, by itself, politically 
neutral; rather, neoliberal governmentality is so easily accepted and maintained partly 
because it provides us with a theory of the world that is intuitively appealing and can be 
accepted without engaging in conscious analysis. Or, as Smith (2011) argues, 
“a neo-liberal/neoconservative framing of the individual supports 
essentialist thinking in a subtle way that is easily overlooked [...]. Neo-
liberalism must locate characteristic features of an individual within the 
individual because there is, logically, no other place to locate them. The 
possibility that the feature or characteristic is a social artefact that might 
be changed by altered circumstances is unexplored because society is left 
largely unexplored” (p.33).  
 
The concept of psychological essentialism can therefore be indispensable for 
understanding how neoliberal rhetoric about personal responsibility or the inherent 
superiority of one stratum of society over another becomes embedded in the collective 
common sense. In short, the power of psychological essentialism is rooted in its intuitive 
appeal and its ability to produce simplified maps of social reality. 
 
 
   
 
   
 
The dialectics of anxiety: Terror Management Theory 
Social and political scientists have commented extensively on one of the central 
paradoxes of neoliberalism – that of the retreat of the State in welfare provision and the 
simultaneous expansion of its disciplinary programmes and penal functions (Wacquant, 
2009). The two prongs of this contradiction are typically explained from a neo-Marxist 
perspective as “two components of a single apparatus for the management of poverty” 
(ibid., p.14), i.e., as a method for controlling recalcitrant surplus populations. However, 
psychology can provide an additional perspective on the functional position of such 
punitive policies in the neoliberal dialectic, particularly with the use of the research 
literature on Terror Management Theory (TMT; Solomon et al., 1991; Greenberg et al., 
2010). 
Terror Management Theorists propose that human beings are tormented by a 
unique existential anxiety stemming from the conflict between two basic, irreconcilable 
principles: the imperative of self-preservation on the one hand, and the awareness that 
mortality is inevitable, and that our capacity for control over our environment is 
extremely limited (Becker, 1973; Solomon et al., 1991). The primary aim of TMT is to 
explain how certain aspects of human culture arise out of the need to manage such fears 
related to mortality and to maintain a sense of permanence, order and meaning in life - 
for example by building a cultural anxiety buffer, or a set of institutions and beliefs that 
will guarantee them some degree of symbolic ‘immortality’ and will keep anxiety outside 
conscious awareness (Burke, Martens & Faucher, 2010).  
In order to function in an uncertain world people need the assumption that its 
basic structure – the rules governing social interaction, their own identity and that of 
others – is stable and reliable, and that their environment and their own being in the 
world are to some degree predictable, and hence – in their control. When the perceived 
stability of one’s social world is undermined, this creates a deep sense of ontological 
insecurity, or “the loss of confidence in the continuity of one’s own self-identity and in the 
shared norms and values of society” (van Marle & Maruna, 2010, p.8). In other words, a 
vague sense of existential anxiety can emerge out of the loss of one’s social roles, 
relationships, financial stability and a coherent life narrative that are fundamental for 
meaning-making. 
   
 
   
 
 
Studying people’s responses to situations characterised by high ontological 
insecurity is particularly instructive for understanding how neoliberal culture becomes 
dispersed in everyday life. The consensus among scholars of late capitalism is that one of 
its major consequences (indeed, one of the main forces behind its internal dynamism) is 
the state of increased insecurity, precarity and instability for large segments of the 
workforce (Harvey, 2005; Brown, 2015) – expressed, for example, in the decline of secure 
long-term employment and the rise in its place of short-term, precarious work. Apart 
from its purely financial consequences, this state of permanent flux can give rise to a 
sense of existential anxiety through the loss of stable identities previously guaranteed by 
long-term employment, the loss of social ties and the de-centring of one’s biography and 
sense of life-trajectory (e.g. Bluck & Habermas, 2000; McAdams et al., 2001). It is precisely 
here that the concept of ontological security can be located in the dialectics of neoliberal 
subjectivity: for, as a system of socio-political transformations and a set of discourses, 
neoliberalism simultaneously creates uncertainty and provides a mechanism for re-
establishing certainty; its ideology offers its own version of the anxiety buffer. The social 
identity that is lost in the dissolution of collectives can be reconstructed anew through 
lifestyle and market choices, and through acts of conspicuous consumption (Kleine et al., 
1993; Chattaraman & Lennon, 2008; Shankar et al., 2009). Ontological insecurity – e.g., 
anxiety related to social cohesion, traditional values and population diversity – fosters 
punitive attitudes and increases support for punitive, even vindictive policies (van Marle 
& Maruna, 2010), and has also been linked with increased reliance on social essentialism 
- one that sees a fundamental ‘otherness’ in socially excluded groups, and thus 
contributes further towards their marginalisation (Young, 2003).  
The crucial insight that psychology can offer us in this case is that the expansion 
of the neoliberal penal state is not simply a top-down institutional process. It is also 
echoed in the active endorsement of this expansion on behalf of large segments of the 
population, as well as in the widespread acceptance of a more essentialist philosophy of 
human nature.  
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
Conclusion 
Ideology functions not merely to win support for and to justify a set of policies; 
rather, it provides the individual subject with a framework for engaging dynamically with 
such policies and the societal transformations they bring. The neoliberal subject is not a 
passive recipient of rhetoric; rather, this rhetoric forms the basis of his/her worldview, 
the platform for an active engagement with neoliberal society. In order to perform its 
functions, ideology must appeal to the subject’s fundamental psychological needs – for 
example by providing a sense of ontological security, a way to construct a stable self-
concept, and a social order that appears stable, natural and just. Psychology can be 
indispensable for understanding how the neoliberal worldview becomes internalised and 
established as common sense, by mapping out the complex interaction between such 
deep needs and the solutions offered in the ideological space of late modernity.  
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